FEDERAL CONTROL OVER CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS TO STOCKHOLDERS UNDER THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT by unknown




MAcDONALD DEMING FRANK A. HUTSON, JR.
Louis T. STONE, JR. GEORGE J. YuDKIN
Comment Editors Note Editors
IRVING PARKER
Article and Book Review Editor
ROWLEY BIALLA LEWIS GREENBAUM CLIFFORD L. PORTER
KENT H. BROWN Roy C. HABERKERN, JR. DANIEL B. POSNER
RICHARD I. GALLAND JOSEPH W. KEENA EARL J. WOFSEY
EDWARD H. KENYON
Subscription price $4.50 per year 8o cents per number
Canadian subscription price $5.00 per year; Foreign, $5.25 per year
Yale Law Journal Company, Inc., Box 401A, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn.
FEDERAL CONTROL OVER CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS TO
STOCKHOLDERS UNDER THE PUBLIC UTILITY
HOLDING COMPANY ACT
ONE of the major problems brought into vivid focus by the financial toll
of the recent business depression has been the need for protecting the small
stockholder or creditor of a large corporation from injudicious distributions
of assets, which might threaten the safety of his investment. Such distribu-
tions, usually in the form of a dividend payment or of a stock reacquisition,
have been, in general, regulated solely by state incorporation statutes.1 The
results have been notoriously ineffective. Since 1933, sporadic legislative
amendments have worked some slight improvements in state regulation.
These improvements, however, are overshadowed by the Congressional experi-
ment, embodied in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,2 at a
thoroughgoing system of federal control over corporate distributions. It is
true that the Holding Company Act affects only public utility holding com-
panies engaged in interstate commerce, and their subsidiaries. But as proposals
1. Railroads are a notable exception. See note 41 infra.
2. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. § 79 (Supp. 1938).
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for federal incorporation grow more insistent a the holding company field may
well become a laboratory in which are nurtured the bases for regulation of
the distribution policies of all American corporations engaged in interstate
commerce. It therefore becomes of current importance to consider, in the
light of the experience under state incorporation statutes, and of the practice
under the Holding Company Act, the need for a comprehensive program of
regulation, and the form such a program should assume.
The need for comprehensive regulation has grown increasingly acute with
the growing complexity of corporate structure. The law governing corporate
distributions emerged to meet the needs of a simple business community:
the small corporation, actively controlled and managed by a few stockholders
who were, typically, known to the creditors. Whbatever protection against
corporate distributions was necessary was, as in the case of an individual
or partnership, for the benefit of creditors. The growth of giant enterprises,
accompanied by the wide dispersion of stock ownership and the divorcement
of ownership from control, has deprived the stockholder of his former power
over corporate distributions.4 This power is now vested in a self-perpetuating
management, with an interest of its own- in jobs, salaries, bonuses and
executive power- which may be contrary to the best interest of stock-
holders.5 To preserve his interest, the manager must create an impression
of success. To this end he may often resort to unsound accounting so as to
report apparent earnings, and dissipations of needed corporation assets so
as to pay regular dividends. The investor0 in his original security contract
3. Bills providing for federal licensing of corporations were introduced in the 76th
Congress-S. 330 (1st Sess.) and in the 75th Congress-S. 10 (1st Sess.) and S. 3072 (3d
Sess.). See HEARaNGs BEFORE SUBcoMMIrrrEE OF CommrirE ON THE JUDICIAny oz. S. 10
AND S. 3072, Pts. 1-4 (1938). The SEC has concluded that federal incorporation of in.
terstate companies is desirable. SEC REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF Tn
WoRK, AcTrvITiEs, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND R.WGANIZATION
CosmmirrEss (hereinafter referred to as SEC REPORT) Pt. VII (1938) 412. The legisla-
tive history of proposals for federal incorporation and views for and against are collected
in FED. TRADE COMM. REPORT ON THE EcONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND CO.IPORATE; PHASEs or
HOLDING AND OPERATING COMPANIES OF ELEcrRiC AND GAS UTILITIES, SE.. Doc. No.
92, Pt. 69-A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934). On the constitutionality of such legislation,
see Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation (1936) 49 HAU. L. RE%,.
396.
4. See BERLE AND MEANs, THE MODERN ConronATio.. AND PRIvATE ProrERMv
(1932) (hereinafter referred to as "B.LE AND ML~s). It is there demonstrated that
of the 200 largest non-banking corporations, controlling some 50% of the corporate
wealth and almost 25% of the national wealth, 129, embracing 80, of the wealth of the
200, were controlled by an independent management or by a legal device; another 46,
with 14% of the wealth of the 200, were managed by important minority stockholders,
with the majority outside the pale of management. See especially pp. 18-118. CI. TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY FUND, BIG ]BUSINESS, ITS GROWTH AND ITS PLACE (1937); Liggett v.
Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 541 (1933), Justice Brandeis dissenting.
5. BERLE AND MEANS, 119-125; SEC REPORT. Pt. VII (1938) 415.
6. The word "investor" when used in this Comment includes both creditors and
stockholders. The term "creditor" when used refers especially to bondholders and other
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
seldom adequately restricts this freedom of action in the manager to determine
corporate distribution policies, since the contract is normally formulated by
the management and the underwriter, and offered to the investor as a falt
accompli. As a result, in appraising the need for protection from injudicious
corporate distributions the stockholder's interest must be classified with that
of the creditor. 7
The preferred stockholder, if past practice is any guide,8 is even more
likely than the creditor to be injured by dissipation of corporate assets through
unwise distributions. Both creditor and preferred stockholder expect an
ultimate refund of their principal, but neither has an effective voting interest
to disapprove of distributions which may operate to defeat their expectation.
The preferred stockholder's interest is, however, subordinate to, and hence
more precarious than, the creditor's; his investment, moreover, is exposed
to business fluctuations and the vicissitudes of corporate policy for a con-
siderably longer period than the creditor's.
The common stockholder, who has theoretical voting control, and is tile
usual beneficiary of distributions, might seem to require no protection. Under
absentee ownership, however, the common stockholder no longer possesses
first-hand knowledge of corporate affairs. He may, as a result, treat as
surplus earnings justifiably available for purposes of consumption, a distri-
bution which is in fact a return of a portion of his original investment.
Further, as has been demonstrated by the practical operation of the proxy
system, the stockholder has been shorn of actual control. 10 An unchecked
management, therefore, by making an ill-advised distribution, even to pre-
ferred stockholders, may so endanger the financial soundness of the enter-
prise as to lead to insolvency. Since the impact of reorganization falls most
heavily on the junior shareholders, the untimely payment may be a source
of irreparable damage to them.
Attempts at statutory protection of investors were made early in the
development of the corporate system. Almost without exception, state regu-
creditors for a period longer than one year inasmuch as the short term creditor is little
affected by most of the practices discussed herein.
7. Though it might be argued that an independent management might be less dis-
posed than a common stock management to make distributions at the expense of pre-
ferred stockholders or creditors, the managers, their self-interest aside, are often owners
of common stock. BEALE AND ME.ANS, 95-118, analyzing the holdings of the management
in the 200 largest corporations. And see SEC REPORT, Pt. VII (1938) 148-176, describ-
ing the common stock interest of the management attempting to promulgate recapitali-
zation plans calling for sacrifices by the preferred stockholders.
8. The notoriously rough treatment accorded the preferred stockholder was brought
into the open by SEC REPORT, Pt. VII (1938) 465-525 and by Commissioner Frank,
dissenting in North American Company, Holding Company Act Release No. 1427, Jan.
30, 1939.
9. Another instance of a direct injury would be that to the remainderman's interest
in shares of stock when dividends out of capital were paid to the life estate.
10. Cf. BERLE AND MEANS, 81-88, 139.
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lation stemmed from the famous decision, in 1824, of Wood v. Dunimcr,n
in which Mr. Justice Story outlawed a distribution of assets to stockholders
on the ground that the "capital stock" was "a 'trust fund' for the payment
of all the debts of a corporation"- a fund the preservation of which is relied
upon by those extending credit to the corporation. The factual basis of the
case and the much criticized doctrinal implications of the use of the term
"trust" are of no present concern.12 But the basic idea expressed in the
opinion- that the investment of the stockholder shall be retained intact
in the enterprise as a margin of safety for creditors' 3 - has now been codified
in some form' 4 in the corporation laws of virtually every state.15
11. 30 Fed. Cas. 435, No. 17,944 (D. Me. 1824).
12. To the effect that the elements of a trust are lacking, see Hunt, The Trust Fss:d
Theory and Some Substitutes For It (1902) 12 Y.ALE L. J. 63. See also McDonald v.
Williams, 174 U. S. 397 (1899), limiting the application of the trust fund doctrine to in-
solvent corporations, and Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 4S 'Minn. 174, 50 N.
W. 1117 (1892), repudiating the doctrine to adopt a reliance rationale. For the persistence
of the doctrine in the case law, see Comment (1938) 47 YXLE L. J. 1164, n. 36, 51, 65.
13. The idea, as applied in subsequent decisions and statutes, will henceforth be re-
ferred to as the rule of Wood v. Dumnzcr.
14. The statutes of five states impose only an insolvency restriction upon distribu-
tions. AMAss. ANN. LAws (1933) c. 158, § 44; Miss. CoDE ANN. (1930) § 4149; N. H.
PuB. LAws (1926) c. 225, § 79; TEx. ANN. Rzv. Ciy. STT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1347;
and Wyo. Sess. Laws, 1939, c. 62, p. 70. The other states, by limiting distributions to
those out of profits or surplus or to those which will not impair capital, enact the rule of
Wood v. Dummer. Five of these states. however, provide the cushion by requiring a debt-
asset ratio or a debt-capital stock ratio. ARiz. PEv. Coo, A,,.. (Struckmeyer, 1923)
§ 587 (debt not to exceed 2/3 of amount of capital stock); NEB. Co.Tr. ST.vr. (1929)
§24-205 (same as Arizona); N. D. Laws, 1931, c. 114 (debts not to exceed capital
stock); O.A. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 9775 (same as North Dakota); UTAn Rhv.
STAT. ANN. (1933) § 18-2-44 (assets not to be reduced to less than 50"% in excess of in-
debtedness). However, even those states with only the insolvency limitation may Uc sub-
ject to common law restrictions against impairment. W~reiner, Theory of Anglo-A.lccan,
Dividend Law: American Statutes and Cases (1929) 29 CoL L. Rnv. 461, 473, 474. But
see Warren, Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations (1923) 36 HAMn'. L. Rcv. 509,
523.
15. There has been a great confusion of terminology in the statutes and decisions at-
tempting to apply the rule of Wood v. Dunner. A few fundamental distinctions of ter-
minology are necessary for the discussion to follow. The assets upon Avhich a corporation
operates, generically described as "capital," are derived from two primary sources, its
creditors and its stockholders. In the balance sheet of the company this source distinction
is made on one side only, that showing liabilities and net v;orth. There is not, and of
course cannot be, any such separation of the assets. In the most elementary manner the
net-worth section may be described as made up of, first, the amount of the contribution
made by the stockholders and dedicated to the business, this being the "Capital Staoc"
account, and, second, the so-called "Surplus" account which reflects the fortunes of the
business and may, at any given time, show either a surplus or a deficit as the result of
past operations. Since current legislation permits splitting up Capital Stock into various
accounts at the discretion of the directors, and labeling one portion as Capital Surplus
(if divided at the issue of the stock it is labeled Paid-in Surplus; if at a subsequent date,
Reduction Surplus), it must be kept dearly in mind that the amount of the assets con-
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The rule against impairment of capital, as thus expressed, gives a deceptive
impression of strength and certainty; in practice it has proved vulnerable to
widespread evasion. Charter-mongering states soon developed a thriving
incorporation business by sanctioning or winking at methods to geld the
rule. A few states -important ones' G- were bold enough to emasculate
the rule ol the face of the statute: dividends paid while capital was impaired
were sanctioned so long as they were measured by current earnings. 7 The
tributed by the stockholders, the source of which is disclosed by the net worth section of
the balance sheet, is actually the sum of Capital Stock and Capital Surplus (Paid-in plus
Reduction Surplus). To distinguish the surplus arising from profits of the business from
this misnamed Capital Surplus, those profits are described as Earned Surplus and are the
only surplus available for distribution within the rule of Wood v. Duininer. See Calla-
han, Statutory Protection of Creditors in Reduction of Capital Stock (1936) 2 OHio ST.
L. J. 220. Cf. Ballantine and Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon Dividends
Under Modern Corporation Laws (1935) 23 CALIF. L. REv. 229, 231-238. The terms
"paid out of capital," "dividends out of capital," and "impairment of capital" are used in
this Comment with respect to distributions of assets which have the effect of reducing
the amount of Capital Stock plus Capital Surplus on the balance sheet below the total
thus set up to indicate the source of the assets contributed by the stockholders.
16. A consideration of the condition of the state incorporation law necessarily must
be weighted by the number and size of corporations incorporated in the various states.
Strangely enough, such figures do not appear to be available. Samples are here present-
ed, however, embracing the large corporations which are the subject matter of this Com-
ment. Poor's Industrial and Utility Volumes list 7000 corporations, supposedly with the
largest public interest, by states of incorporation. These have been measured and esti-
mated but not actually counted. The Federal Trade Commission listed the states of in-
corporation and the assets of 396 domestic corporations with assets of $50,000,000 and
over. HEARINGS OrN S. 10 AND S. 3072, supra note 3, at 768. These compilations follow:
Poor's F. T. C. 396
7,000 No. Assets
(% of total) (% of total) (% of total)
Delaware .............. 22% 26% 27%
New York ............. 10% 16% 23%
Pennsylvania ........... 8% 8% 8%
Ohio .................. 7% 5% 3%
Massachusetts .......... 6%c 3% 3%
New Jersey ............ 5% 10% 14%
Illinois ................ 4% 5% 5C
Michigan .............. 4% 1% 1%
California .............. 4% 3% 4%
Maine ................. 2% 3% 3%
Maryland .............. 2% 3% 3%
Totals ............. 74% 83% 94%
Thus, among the largest corporations, the corporation law of eleven states deserves
the major emphasis. As the number of corporations included in the sample gets smaller
and their size larger the proportion incorporated in the major states increases. Of the 573
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1928, Delaware claimed 26%,
New York 21%, and New Jersey 16%. BERLE AND MEANS, 204, n. 18.
17. Five states permit dividends out of current earnings despite a capital impairment.
Three of these restrict this privilege entirely when a deficiency exists not only in the com-
mon capital but in the preferred as well. DEL. REv. CODE (1935) § 2066; Ga. Laws,
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bulk of the states resorted to the more subtle method of devising schemes
under which "capital stock" could be called "surplus." Most important was
the sanctioning of a division of the consideration paid for no-par stock
between capital stock and surplus, thereby creating a "paid-in" surplus free
under state statutes for distribution as dividends.Ys Those who lacked the
foresight to employ no-par financing had scant difficulty in clearing the ground
for distributions out of capital. By reducing the stated amount of the capital
stock of the corporation and thereby creating a reduction surplus or elimin-
ating a deficit the way was paved for present or future distributions. Less
obviously, the reduction, by allowing a write-down of assets against a reduc-
tion surplus, diminished depreciation charged to income, and to that extent
increased the income available for dividends. So long as the corporation
was not rendered insolvent by the distribution'0 following the reduction in
capital, the managers did not run afoul of state statutes.20 Theirs was only
the routine task of feeding proxies to dividend-hungry stockholders to induce
an approval of the reduction. Corporate managers could circumvent the rule
Extra Sess. (1937-38), § 22-308, at § 16; Kan. Laws 1939, c. 152, §§ 80, 81. The other
two, under similar circumstances, restrict common dividends but permit preferred. CAL.
Clv. CODE (Deering, 1937) §346; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1938) §7492-21. The
English law also permits dividends out of current earnings despite impairment. Verner v.
General & Comm. Inv. Trust, 118941 2 Ch. 239; PALMER'S COMIA , LAw (16th ed.
1938) 204-15.
18. At least 22 states permit this creation of paid-in surplus, ARE. Duw. STAT. (Pope,
1937) § 2180; CAL. CIv. CoDE (Deering, 1937) § 300b; COLO. STAT. Axxu. (IMichie, 1935)
c. 41, § 12f; DEI.. Ray. CODE (1935) § 2046; Ga. Laws Extra Sess. 1937-38 §22-303, at
§ 12; IDAHO CODE Axx. (1932) § 29-128; ILL. REV. STAT. A%x. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c.
32, § 157.2(k) ; Kan. Laws 1939, c. 152, § 43; LA. GEv. STAT. Anx. (Dart, 1939) § 1105;
Me. Laws 1931, c. 150; MD. AxN. CoaE (Flack, 1935) Art. 23, §39 (3); Micu. STAT.
Axx. (Henderson, 1937) § 21.20 (the value of no-par shall be at least S0% of considera-
tion and if reduced below notice must be sent to all unsecured creditors) ; MI:.xx. SrTT.
(Mason, Supp. 1938) §7492-1; NEv. Comp. LAN% S (Hillyer, 1929) § 1623; X. J. Ra,.
STAT. (1937) tit. 14, c. 8, § 6; N. Y. STocx CORpOR.ATiO LAw §§ 12, 13 (no-par minimum
$1 per share) ; OHIO GEN. CODE AiNz. (Page, 1938) § 8623-23; PA. STAT. A.-.:. (Pur-
don, 1930 [1938 ed.]) tit. 15, §2852-614; R. 1. GE-. LAws (1938) c. 11(, Art. II, §53;
TENx. CODE ANN. (Williams. 1934) § 3735; VA. COPE (Michie & Sublett, 1936) §3940;
WASH. REv. STAT. AN . (Remington, Supp. 1939) § 3803-23. It should be noted that
included are all the important corporation states (see note 16 suipra) except Massachu-
setts. The latter has only an insolvency limitation, which makes paid-in surplus provi-
sions nugatory. The states of California, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota and
Pennsylvania have tightened their provisions to protect the preferred stockholders (see
notes 24, 25 infra).
19. Actually the distribution was limited so that assets could not he reduced below
the sum of liabilities and capital stock, as reduced. Since, howvever, the capital stock could
be reduced to a nominal amount, the restriction thus imposed was, in effect, limited to the
insolvency situation.
20. On the state law on reduction of capital, sce Comment (1935) 44 YALE L J.
1025; Callahan, Statutory Protection of Creditors in Reduction of Capital Stoch (193ti)
2 OHIO ST. L. J. 220; SEC REPORT, Pt. VII (193S), 483-493; IMAntLE, CAP iTAL SUR-
PLUS AND CORPORATE NET WORTH (1936) 77-110.
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against impairment in still another fashion by dressing up a distribution in
the form of a purchase of the company's own stock. In the one-half of the
states which imposed statutory limitations on the withdrawal of capital by
the purchase of the corporation's own shares, resort could be had to the
"paid-in" surplus and "reduction" surplus dodges. 21  With these obvious
methods of subterfuge available, rare indeed was the corporate manager
who impaled himself on the rule against impairment. In fact, even when a
manager was so unwary as to commit an impairment, creditors and stock-
holders had scant protection, for their preventive and compensatory remedies
alike were woefully inadequate.
22
Since 1933 there have been some efforts to plug these gaps. By providing
that a company's own shares may be purchased only out of earned surplus,
21. In the other half of the states, the common law rules are in conflict, On treasury
stock, see generally Nussbaum, Acquisition By A Corporation of Its Own Stock (1935)
35 CoL. L. REV. 971; Levy, Purchase By A Corporation of Its Own Stock (1930) 15
MINN. L. REv. 1; MARPLE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 53-76, analyzing the statutes, The
English law prohibits purchase of treasury shares. Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas.
409 (1887) ; PALMER'S COMPANy LAW (16th ed. 1938) 56-57.
22. It has been held that an injunction sought by a common stockholder will not lie
against the declaration of a preferred dividend because the statute provides an adequate
remedy at law. Schoenfeld v. American Can Co., 55 AtI. 1044 (N. J. Ch. 1903). Com-
pensatory remedies against a stockholder recipient of an illegal dividend are meager. At
common law, in the absence of knowledge he is not liable. McDonald v. Williams, 174
U. S. 397 (1899) ; Quintal v. Adler, 146 Misc. 300, 262 N. Y. Supp. 126 (1933), aff'd, 238
App. Div. 820, 262 N. Y. Supp. 924 (1933) ; rearg. denied, 239 App. Div. 775 (1933) ;
aff'd, 264 N. Y. 452, 191 N. E. 509 (1934) ; Bartlett v. Smith, 162 Md. 478, 160 Atl. 440,
161 AtI. 509 (1932), collecting the authority contra. The statutes of a few states, how-
ever, give a remedy against the innocent stockholder. IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 29-130
(where directors do not satisfy creditors); IowA CODE (1935) § 8378; LA. GEN. STAT.
ANN. (Dart, 1939) § 1107 (where directors do not satisfy creditors); ME. Rav. STAT.
(1930) c. 56, § 102; Md. Laws 1937, c. 504, § 9; MICH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1937)
§21.48; MIss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 4149; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1938) c. 116, Art. II, §38;
VA. CODE ANN. (Michie & Sublett, 1936) § 3840; WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington,
Supp. 1939) § 3803-25 (where directors do not satisfy creditors); W. VA. CODE ANN.
(Michie & Sublett, 1937) § 3090; Wis. STAT. (1937) § 182.19. The creditor's remedy
against the directors probably also lies only in event of dissolution or insolvency. Com-
ment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1025, 1030, n. 16, analyzing the statutes. The plea by the di-
rector that he relied in good faith upon the financial statements furnished by responsible
officers or accountants is expressly made a complete defense in eleven states, including
Delaware, New York, Illinois and California, and probably would excuse him in virtually
all the states. Dissenting directors are also excused. The stockholder, to bring an action,
must surmount, in addition to the expense, the difficult procedural obstacles involved in
joining the corporation and the directors as defendants, since most statutes grant the rem-
edy against the directors to the corporation. But cf. Appleton v. American Malting Co.,
65 N. J. Eq. 375, 54 Ati. 454 (1903) ; Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co., 72 N. J. Eq, 403,
65 Atl. 910 (1907) ; Cartwright v. Albuquerque Hotel Co., 36 N. M. 189, 11 P. (2d) 261
(1932). Interesting to the preferred stockholder is the possibility that upon reduction of
capital stock he might secure an appraisal and liquidation of his stock. In re Kinney, 279
N. Y. 423, 18 N. E. (2d) 645 (1939).
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some states have sought to curb evasion by reacquisition of stock. 3 In the
dividend field, efforts have been directed at stopping the widest breach -
the creation and distribution of paid-in and reduction surplus. Thus in a
handful of states the creation of paid-in surplus or reduction surplus upon
the issue of no-par preferred stock has been prohibited, the practice now
being restricted to no-par common stock.2-4 Other revisions have imposed
prohibitions on the payment of common dividends out of already-created
paid-in surplus .2 5 Payment of preferred dividends out of this type of surplus,
however, is still unrestricted.
Even the most advanced type of state legislation, then, falls short of the
standard laid down in Wood v. Dumncr - that the investment of the stock-
holders shall be retained intact in the business for the benefit of creditor3
(and stockholders). The extent of the protection furnished by Wood z.
Dunmmer itself, however, depends upon the tools employed to determine the
adherence to the terms of the rule-that the assets contributed by the
stockholders have been retained intact and that only earned surplus is being
distributed. The most obvious set of equipment and the one initially to
be employed in making the determination is sound accounting procedure.
For the purposes of this Comment, the most significant accounting problems
cluster about valuation of the fixed assets,20 which in the case of an operating
company are its plant and equipment, and in the case of a holding company,
its ownership of securities of subsidiaries. Sound accounting for fixed assets
23. CA.. Cirv. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 342; Ga. Laws Extra Sess. 1937-38, § .- 303,
at § 10 (d) (where there are preferred shares outstanding); ILL. Rn-. STAT. Ai.
(Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 32, § 157.6; Afixx. ST.T. (Mason, Supp. 1933) §7492-21 (where
there are preferred shares outstanding). Some exceptions are made for specified purposes.
24. Preferred stock may not be stated at or reduced below agreed consideration,
CA.. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1937) §§300b, 348; COLO. ST.AT. ANN. (.Michie, 1935) c. 41,
§ 12f; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930 [193S ed.]) tit. 15 §§2852-614, 2,52-705; below
liquidation preferences, ILL. REv. STAT. AN. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) C. 32, §§ 157.19,
157.60; xlx-x . STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1938) §§ 7492-20, 7492-38 (vithout preferred con-
sent) ; below either agreed consideration on all shares or amount of preferences plus $5
on other shares, S. D. CODE (1939) § 11.0401.
25. The statutes of California, Illinois, 'Michigan, Minnesota and Pennsylvania pro-
vide that dividends out of paid-in surplus shall be paid only to preferred shareholders,
who shall be notified of the source. From the point of view of the preferred stockholder
this restriction is more important than the restriction upon the creation of paid-in or re-
duction surplus from preferred stock inasmuch as under the latter restriction such surplua
could be created from common stock and distributed to common stocklolders. The stat-
utes barring dividends to common stockholders from paid-in or reduction surplus pre-
sumably include such surplus arising from common stock Unfortunately common stoc:-
holders are not protected from preferred dividends. Since California and Minnesota per-
mit dividends out of current earnings (see note 17 supra) the effect of these progressive
steps may be largely vitiated in those states.
26. 'Many accounting problems arise in connection vith valuation of current assets,
especially inventories. Since, however, current assets are more susceptible of accurate
valuation than fixed assets, injuries to investors as a result of inaccurate valuations are
less likely.
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necessitates that in calculating the amount of earned surplus a, tilable for
dividends the cost of those assets be prorated over their life-span avd charged
against income annually to take care of depreciation, and that the assets
contributed by the stockholders be valued at original cost.
2 7
The theory justifying the valuation of assets at cost is that, when acquired
through an arms-length bargaining process, the cost is equal to the real
worth. The determination of the cost of the assets, however, is often a
difficult accounting problem. In a situation where no arms-length transaction
occurs, as in the instance of a deal between two companies of the same
corporate family, the presumption in favor of the figure set by the manage-
ment permits the directors to assign to the transferred property a book value
substantially in excess of its real worth .2  This inflation of cost is motivated
by a desire to achieve inter-company profits which will allow dividends by
the seller from the resulting surplus. Even where the sale is based upon
bona fide bargaining, if the property is exchanged for stock of the buyer,
the cost assigned to the assets acquired depends upon the solution of the
difficult problem of valuing the stock.29 The presumption is again in favor
of the directors' valuation"0 -generally enough in excess of the par or stated
value of the stock to create on the buyer's books a substantial surplus, avail-
able for dividends under state laws. When the value assigned by the directors
27. Cf. SANDERS, HATFIELD AND MOORE, A STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
(1938) 58-64. The effect of charging depreciation to income and distributing only earn-
ings after depreciation is to accumulate in the business a fund, equal, when a fixed asset
has been wholly depreciated, to the original cost of the asset. If this fund is to be used
automatically to replace such wholly-depreciated plant, the investor might advance serious
theoretical objections of economic validity. Such a system forces the shareholders to rein-
vest their funds at the discretion of the management, even though the productivity of the
capital may be lower than in some other enterprise. According to the economists if it
does not pay, because of lo.ver productivity of capital, to invest new capital in order to
carry on the business, economic waste results when depreciation reserves are accumulated
and used to buy renewals. Cf. FOWLER, THE DEPRECIATION OF CAPITAL (1934) 107-113.
Consequently, it would be entirely defensible to erect a system of distribution of assets
which would permit payments equal to profits before providing for depreciation; indeed
this principle is already applied in the so-called "wasting-asset" companies. Realistically,
the import of this theory is diminished in non-wasting-asset companies by the rarity of a
complete replacement of plant; replacement there is generally a gradual process.
This depreciation process is also subject to the criticism that the cost of replacement,
except for the sheerest coincidence, is almost certain to vary from the cost of the original
equipment. Leaving aside questions of technological changes in the nature of the desirable
equipment, economists point out that the fluctuations in the purchasing power of the dol-
lars available for replacement may, assuming that the purchasing value of the dollar has
declined, result in an insufficient fund for the reproduction of assets. Or, if the business
is to be liquidated at the time the assets are worn out, the investor may find that the dol-
lars he received, while equal in amount to the dollars he invested, do not have the same
purchasing power as the original dollar. Id. at 5.
28. The cases are collected in BERLE AND MEANs, 252-254, especially n. 10.
29. SANDERs, HATFIELD AND MOORE, op. cit. supra note 27, at 59-60.
30. See note 28 supra.
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thus exce-ds the real worth, the question is squarely presented whether the
investor-Las relied upon the value assigned and the company should therefore
be forbidden to make payments from earned surplus until the actual value
of original assets plus subsequently earned assets equals the value assigned.
Such a restriction on earned surplus might be considered fair on the assump-
tion that the investor has relied on the larger figure faultily stated by the
management and has no adequate means to ascertain the true value. On the
other hand, such an assumption perhaps imposes too severe a penalty for
faulty bookkeeping where the directors may have made an honest mistake
in solving an intrinsically difficult valuation problem, and the actual value
may furnish an adequate protective cushion to investors.31
Whichever figure is to be relied upon by the investor- that stated by
the management or that representing the true value of the contributed assets
-the scope of accounting techniques seriously limits their utility as tools
to ascertain its retention in the business undiminished. Accountants do not
attempt, except perhaps in dealing with current assets, to do more than
record historical cost,32 from which current values fluctuate widely. Con-
sequently, although the accountant's historical figures might indicate that
the capital cushion remains unimpaired, the apparent safety of the investor
indicated by these figures m y prove illusory if the current market value
has dropped in the interim. The rule of Wood v. Dunzncr must therefore
be supplemented by indicia of value beyond those furnished by the historical
costs presented by the accountant. 33
No business problem is more difficult and uncertain of solution than that
of valuation of the assets of an enterprise. The key to the solution, financial
experts agree, is in the earning pdwer of the assets. Capitalization of the
earnings, at least in theory, will reveal the value of the assets.3 4 But what
earnings to capitalize, and at what rate, are often practical problems of
31. In the few instances where this problem has arisen under state corporation laws,
the decisions have been in conflict. It has been held that the actual value of assets must b2
brought up to the assigned value before the company may legally pay a diidend. Shields
v. Hobart, 172 Mo. 491, 72 S. W. 669 (1903) ; Shaw v. Ansaldi Co., Inc., 178 App. Div.
5S9, 165 N. Y. Supp. 872 (1917) ; ef. Spokane v. Northern P. Ry., 15 1. C. C. 376 (1909).
Contra: Peters v. U. S. Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11, 114 Atd. 598 (1921) ; United Light
& Power Co. v. Grand Rapids Trust Co.. 85 F. (2d) 331 (1936) (authorities collected
at 336), dismissed by stipulation, 299 U. S. 618 (1936) ; see Goodnow v. American Writ-
ing Paper Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 645, 66 Atl. 607 (1907), aff'd, 73 N. J. Eq. 692, 69 At!. 1014
(1908). On this point cf. the discussion in Weiner, supra note 14, 29 COL L. Rm 461,
468-472. 'Mr. Weiner concludes [30 COL. L. REv. 330, at 347] that "the whole question of
the effect of stock watering on the subsequent right of a company to pay dividends re-
mains, today, unanswered."
32. SAN-DERs. HATFIE AND oos0, op. cit. supra note 27, at 59-60.
33. A good discussion of the relation of accounting valuations of fixed assets to the
problems presented by the practice of the rule against impairment appears in Weiner and
Bonbright, Theory of Anglo-Amcrican Dividend Law: Surplus and Profits (1930) 30
Cot- L. R-v. 330, 337 et seq.
34. See DEING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORr0A'TION S (3d ed. 1934) 144.
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extreme difficulty. The help given by the accountant's income statement,
recording past earnings, is limited to the extent that the present value is a
function not so much of recorded past earnings as of estimated future earn-
ings, subject to the action of such unpredictable factors as changes in tech-
nology, fickleness of consumer demand, additional competition and unfavor-
able legislation. The solution of this valuation problem, however difficult,
is essential to an effective application of the rule of Wood v. Duinmr.85
The rule itself, however, whether coupled with the accountant's historical
figures or more current indicia of value, has one important shortcoming from
the point of view of the investor whose principal may be threatened by
withdrawals of capital. It assumes that an investor is adequately protected
when the capital cushion on which he relied is preserved intact in the business.
But when that capital contribution of the stockholders is small in relation
to the contribution of the creditors, the thin cushion creates the ever-present
danger that the reorganization provisions of the bankruptcy statutes may
be touched off, either when a dwindling in the value of the fixed assets
reduces the value of the total assets below liabilities so as to create insolvency
in the bankruptcy sense, or when inadequate earnings or unforeseen operating
reverses, coupled with the continual drain of the liquid assets of the company
to meet the interest due on the bonds, forces a default on the bonds, creating
insolvency in the equity sense.8 6 Apart from the social waste consequent
upon bankruptcy,3 7 under existing reorganization standards the full loss may
well be visited on junior stockholders. 88 The rule of Wood v. Dutnmer, in
safeguarding the capital cushion, is thus adequate to protect the investor,
especially the stockholder, only when the cushion itself is sufficient to remove
35. For a full discussion of the technique of capitalization of earnings, see id. at 144
et seq.
36. Chapter X of the Chandler Act treats insolvency in either the bankruptcy or
the equity sense as a basis for reorganization. 52 STAT. 886, 11 U. S. C. A. § 530 (Supp.
1938). To the effect that overcapitalization is an important cause of business failure, see
DEWING, Op. cit. suPra note 34, at 1094-99; JEREMIAH, CORuPORATE BOND DEFAULT (1936)
esp. 84; FirzPATIUcK, SYMPTOMS OF INDUSTRIAL FAILURES (1931) 124. The drain of
liquid assets might also create insolvency in the bankruptcy sense-a more remote
possibility.
37. The economists would have it that it pays socially for business enterprises to
continue to operate so long as their revenues cover out-of-pocket costs, or their out-of-
pocket losses are less than the losses which would be incurred by shutting down, Inabil-
ity to pay interest, consequently, is not a useful criterion for determining when the enter-
prise should be subjected to the expense of insolvency proceedings. Harrod, The Expan-
Sion of Credit in an Advancing Community (1934) 1 EcONOmIcA (N. s.) 287, 289 et seq.;
Rostow and Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters X and
XI of the Bankruptcy Act (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1334, 1374; FRANK, SAVE AMERUcA
FIRST (1938) 385. To the effect that top-heavy debt structures may be an aggravating
cause in depressions, see TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, DEnTS AND REcovERuv, 1929 To
1937 (1938) 176-217, 253.
38. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 60 Sup. Ct. 1 (U. S. 1939);
Community Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1803, Nov. 18, 1939.
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the threat of reorganization. And the small investor is not only incompetent
to appraise this risk, but also, in view of his inferior bargaining relation to
the modem large corporation, is unable to secure an adequate capital cushion.
A modem system of control over distributions of corporate assets to stock-
holders might well be designed, therefore, to achieve for the investor the
adequate capital cushion he is powerless to secure. Such a system would
permit new issues of fixed obligations only when they did not furnish such
a large proportion of the assets contributed by all investors as to create a
danger that the continuity of the business would be interrupted by the
intrusion of reorganization proceedings.30 Where, moreover, bonded debt
disproportionate to assets already exists, the availability of earned surplus
might well be restricted until a protective cushion has been built up, sufficient
to remove the danger of reorganization.
The proportion of bonded indebtedness that a company can with safety
carry depends both upon the margin of safety which must be present to
insure that dwindling of the value of the assets will not lead to reorganiza-
tion, and upon the sufficiency and stability of the earnings which produce
the constant influx of liquid assets necessary to offset the continual drainage
of assets required to pay bond interest and so stave off equity insolvency.
Income statements over a long enough time-span provide a fairly reliable
indication of the amount and stability of earnings. The related problem of
whether the excess of assets over debts provides a sufficient margin, however,
cannot be solved by using balance sheet figures to value the assets. Indicia
of value beyond those revealed by historical accounting costs are here neces-
sary, just as they were to determine whether the capital cushion remained
intact as required by the rule of Wood v. Dummer. The technique there
employed, capitalization of earnings, is again indicated.
Any modem system of control over distributions to stockholders, seeking
to attain balanced financial structures by placing limits on new bond issues,
or by limiting withdrawals from unbalanced structures until earned assets
restore equilibrium, must attempt the solution of the difficult problem of
valuation by capitalization of earnings. It must bring to bear, in the attempt,
every tool at its command. Accounting tools, despite their limitations, may
be of real assistance. The accountant's report of past earnings is a valuable
clue to the trend of the future earnings which must be employed in asset
valuation. A high debt-asset ratio calculated from the accountant's balance
sheet, and instability of earnings revealed by his earnings report, may furnish
the first indications of danger of an unbalanced financial structure. To insure
prompt perception of the danger signals, it is justifiable to require retro-
39. See Mfoore, Railroad Fixed Charges in Bankruptcy Proceedings (1939) 47 J. Pot.
Ecox. 100, 107-115; Rostow and Cutter, op. cit. supra note 37, at 1375. Both articles sug-
gest that when a "new" corporation emerges from the reorganization process this danger
inherent in debt financing should be minimized.
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spective correction of excessive valuations originally placed on assets by the
management.
Accounting techniques thus furnish a valuable start in any realistic attack
on the difficult problem of valuation which must be solved before unbalanced
corporate structures can be eliminated. And it is this elimination of unbalanced
corporate structures, rather than merely the preservation of the original capi-
tal cushion, at which the experiment in federal administrative control over
distribution of corporate assets, recently undertaken by the Securities and
Exchange Commission 40 under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, is directed.
41
THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT
The jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission over distri-
bution of a corporation's assets rests directly on Section 12(c) of the Act
which provides that:
"It shall be unlawful for any registered holding company or any
subsidiary company thereof . . . to declare or pay any dividend
on any security of such company or to acquire, retire, or redeem any
security of such company, in contravention of such rules and regu-
lations or orders as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate
to protect the financial integrity of companies in holding-company
systems, to safeguard the working capital of public utility companies,
to prevent the payment of dividends out of capital or unearned
surplus, or to prevent the circumvention of the provisions of this
title or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder." 42
40. Hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Commission" and sometimes as "SEC."
41. The Interstate Commerce Act, 41 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 20a (1934),
gives the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over railroad financial practices.
Thus § 20a (2) regulates the issue of capital stock or bonds and § 20a (12) makes it un-
lawful for any officer or director of a carrier to "participate in the making or paying of
any dividend of an operating carrier from any funds properly included in the capital ac-
count." Violation of § 20a (12) is a misdemeanor punishable by fine, imprisonment or
both. The constitutionality of § 20a (2) has been upheld. Pittsburgh & W,. V. Ry. v.
Interstate Commerce Comm., 293 Fed. 1001 (1923), appeal dismissed, 266 U. S. 640
(1924).
The statutory standard granted under § 20a (12) amounts to the equivalent of the rule
against impairment. The case law on cash dividends, if any, is sparse, but questions of
issue of stock dividends and dividends payable in bonds have arisen. The Commission
has held that the issue of bonds as a dividend is not compatible with the public interest.
Stock of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R., 67 I. C. C. 156 (1921), N. Y. L. & W.
Stock and Bonds, 131 I. C. C. 34 (1927). But cf. Charleston & Western C. Ry. Co.
Bonds, 193 I. C. C. 309 (1933). Stock dividends have been permitted, Stock of Delaware.
L. & W. R. R., 67 I. C. C. 426 (1921), although the Commission there said that "a sub-
stantial surplus should remain uncapitalized as a support for the applicant's credit . . ."
For a full discussion see SHARM~AN, III-A THE INTERSTATE COMIERCE COMMISS101
(1935) 502 et seq.
42. 49 STAT. 823 (1935). 15 U. S. C. A. § 791 (Supp. 1938).
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The words of this section of the statute appear dearly to provide the basis
for full and effective protection of creditors and stocdolders. Not only does
Congress furnish the Commission with a standard amounting to a rule against
impairment in the clause "to prevent the payment of dividends out of capital
or unearned surplus," but it would appear that Congress, by the phrases
"to protect the financial integrity of companies" and "to safeguard the working
capital," intended to empower the Commission to protect investors from
injuries which might result from withdrawals tending to render a corporate
financial structure unbalanced or illiquid. Although it seems reasonable that
this section might also be utilized to control the "reduction of capital stock"
antics of utility corporations, 43 the Commission has professed to find its
sanction for such jurisdiction44 in Section 6(a) (2) which makes it unlawful
for a registered holding company to "exercise any privilege or right to alter
the priorities, preferences, voting power, or other rights of the holders of an
outstanding security" 45 without an effective declaration under Section 7.4
And under Section 7(e) such a declaration is not to become effective if the
Commission finds that the transaction will "result in an unfair or inequitable
distribution of voting power or is otherwise detrimental to the public interest
or the interest of investors or consumers." Section 7(f) further authorizes
the Commission to impose such terms and conditions as it finds necessary to
insure compliance with the section.
The Commission secures a further control over the financial structure of
utility corporations by the terms of Section 6(a) (1) which requires an
effective declaration before a registered company is able to issue or sell any
security of such company. By the terms of Section 7(d), the declaration
may be denied effectiveness if the security is not reasonably adapted to the
security structure of the dedarant, if it is not reasonably adapted to its
earning power, or if the terms and conditions of the issue or sale are detri-
mental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers. Sec-
tion 7(f) permits the imposition of terms as a condition of granting of the
declaration.47
43. Since the Commission has interpreted its power under § 12 (c) to extend to divi-
dends out of earned surplus [see p. 506 fnfra], even if dividends were declared out of
earnings subsequent to reduction the Commission, under its own conception of the scope
of § 12 (c) could intervene at any time. Moreover, it could take the logical position that
until earnings had been accumulated equal to the amount of the reduction of the capital,
the dividends were actually out of capital surplus within the literal meaning of § 12 (c).
44. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 1417, Jan.
25, 1939.
45. 49 STAT. 814 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. § 79f (Supp. 1938).
46. 49 STAT. 815 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. §79g (Supp. 1938).
47. Section 6 (b) permits the Commission to eNempt from the provisions of sub-
section (a) the issue 6r sale of any security by any subsidiary company of a registered
holding company, under certain circumstances, subject, however, to such terms and condi-
tions as the Commission deems appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors or consumers. The control over financial structures exercised under § 6 (a) (1),
therefore, may be exercised as well in connection with exemptions under § 6 (b).
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With such grants of power at its disposal, as well as others of less present
significance, 48 the Commission appears equipped to execute a program measur-
ing up to all the standards of investor protection suggested previously in
this Comment. Not only could affirmative steps be taken under Section 12(c)
and Sections 6(a)(2), 7(e) and 7(f) to restrict withdrawals even out of
earned surplus until a more balanced financial structure is built up, but direct
adjustments of the balance of the structures can be secured by vigilant enforce-
ment of Sections 6(a)(1) and 7(d) and (f).
The opinions of the Commission indicate that it fully realizes the power
it possesses. Considering the scope of Section 12(c), 49 the Commission has
stated that the section "makes unlawful the declaration or payment of any
dividends in contravention not only of rules and regulations of the Com-
mission, but also of its orders. . . . It is conceivable that under certain
circumstances the Commission might prohibit the payment of dividends out
of earned surplus by order, provided that the prescribed statutory standards
existed." 50 Furthermore, in extending Section 6(a) (2) to embrace "reduc-
tion" cases, the Commission has adopted a criterion perhaps even wider
than Section 12(c) ; for under Section 7(e), complementary to Section 6(a)-
(2), the Commission is to consider, and has actually considered,' the purpose
of the reduction not only in terms of inequitable distribution of voting power
but also in terms of detriment to the public interest or the interest of investors
or consumers.
If the Commission's conception of the broad scope of its power under
Section 12(c) should turn out to be ill-grounded, the conditions attached
by the Commission to Section 6(a) declarations will assume a vital importance
48. An important power at the disposal of the Commission, which it has thus far
utilized mostly as a threat, is its power under § 11 (b) (2) to take steps to distribute vot-
ing power fairly and equitably among security holders.
49. The Commission has promulgated three rules under § 12 (c). Rule U-12C-l, C.
C. H. Secur. Act. Serv. 118400 (1937), covers the acquisition of a corporation's own se-
curities and except for certain specified purposes and a leeway of 1/10 of 1% of the as-
sets, requires an application to the Commission. Rule U-12C-2, id. at 1 8400A, requires
that no declaration of dividends out of capital or unearned surplus may be made without
the approval of the Commission. Rule U-12C-3, id. at ff 8400B, extends the scope of Rule
U-12C-2 to cover payments of principal or interest on obligations issued as dividends out
of capital or unearned surplus, whether such dividend was declared before or after the
Act took effect. Because of its retroactive operation, this rule may create some constitu-
tional difficulties. The Commission's jurisdiction, however, is not limited by its rules
since the statute makes unlawful declaration or payment in contravention of orders as
well. Since, however, the Commission has no procedure geared to secure notice of these
dividends except through the usual financial channels, the dividend declarations it passes
upon are only those under Rules U-12C-2 and U-12C-3 applications. Until further ma-
chinery is set up, the Commission may overlook undesirable payments not within the
scope of existing rules. See note 53 infra.
50. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 3 S. E. C. 313, 319 (1938).
51. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 1417, Jan.
25, 1939, p. 6 et seq.
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for investor protection. Of course, if the power under 12(c) is plenary,
these conditions may be, as one commissioner has argueda 2 mere superero-
gations. None the less, the imposition of conditions under Section 6(a)
serves to indicate the attitude the Commission will take under Section 12(c),
if the companies under surveillance attempt to declare or pay dividends. 3
In surveying the contributions made by the Commission in conducting this
experiment in administrative control of corporate distribution policies, then,
consideration must be given not only to decisions upon applications to pay
dividends under Section 12(c), but also to cases in which the Commission
has imposed conditions upon corporations coming within its jurisdiction
under 6(a) (1) and 6(a) (2).
The Commission's opinions vividly indicate the impact of a realistic ap-
proach, in terms of liquidity, sufficiency of common stock equity and functional
valuation of assets upon the problem of investor protection. In the cases
arising under Section 6(a)(1), the conditions imposed by the Commission
have varied with the type of security proposed. In applications for an issue
of preferred stock for refunding purposes, the Commission has several times
conditioned its acquiescence upon an agreement by the applicant not to
purchase or otherwise acquire any of its common stock or pay any dividends
or make other distributions on common which would impair the existing
common capitalization.5 4 Except that corresponding limitations are not placed
upon distributions to preferred stock, the Commission, by freezing the capital
cushion, employs in these cases the rule of Wood '. DuzMMr.
The conclusion should not be drawn, however, that the Commission has
adopted, in the preferred refunding cases, a restriction no stronger than the
simple rule against impairment. That rule does not protect the senior investor
against the dilution, by the issue of additional senior or coordinate securities,
of the amount of assets per share behind his stock. By insisting in these
cases on a limitation upon the issue of debentures or additional preferred,
the Commission has provided preferred stockholders with a safeguard as
essential for their protection as are limitations upon distributions of assets
52. Commissioner Mathews, dissenting in Columbia Gas & Electric Corporation,
Holding Company Act Release No. 1417, Jan. 25, 1939, p. 17.
53. One reason why the Commission may be imposing conditions under § 6 (a) is
the greater administrative feasibility of indicating what its policy is likely to be at the
time the company's financial situation is under scrutiny rather titan awaiting dividend
declarations and studying each situation de novo. At the present time, moreover, the
Commission has no procedure geared to secure notice of these dividends except through
the usual financial channels. Presumably, however, the Commission w ould not feel bound
to limit its jurisdiction under § 12 (c) to the extent of restrictions imposed under § 6a if
it felt that changed conditions warranted more extensive limitations upon the corporation.
54. San Antonio Public Service Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1630, July
12, 1939; West Penn Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1639, July 14, 1939;
Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1646, July 18, 1939;
Central Ohio Light & Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 16S4, August 8,
1939 (§ 6 (b) case [see note 47 supra]).
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to junior stockholders.5 5 Provision was also made in these cases for passing
the voting control to the preferred stockholders when dividend arrearages
begin to accumulate5 6 - a measure of theoretical value, whose pragmatic
importance may be questioned in view of the inadequacies of the proxy
machinery as a device to consummate stockholder control.
A particularly striking departure from the Wood v. Duntmer rule appears in
the North American case.57 There debenture bonds and preferred stock were
to be issued, partly to refund existing obligations and partly to retire the deben-
tures and preferred stock of a subsidiary about to be merged into the parent,
Apparently based upon "informal suggestions" 8 of the Commission, the
declarant provided for the preferred shareholders protection of a character
substantially in advance of the usual corporate practice. Thus dividends to
common shareholders were contingent upon the existence of a cushion carved
out of earned surplus59 in an amount equal to 15% of the aggregate par
value of the preferred stock then outstanding. When this is added to the
cushion furnished by the par values of the preferred and common stock,
which par values could not be reduced without the future approval of the
Commission, the total protection afforded preferred shareholders amounted
to about 250%o of the par value of the preferred shares. So far as distribu-
tions to common stockholders were concerned, the additional 15% limitation
upon the distribution of earned surplus was in excess of any requirement
under a rule against impairment. Added significance is assumed by this
restriction when it is considered that the strong earning power of the appli-
cant indicated that the real value of the assets perhaps exceeded the book
value in terms of which the protection was couched. Furthermore, the depre-
ciation and maintenance provisions of the declarant were most liberal, tending
toward conservative earnings reports and conservative property values on
the corporation's books. Thus the Commission has made a bargain for the
investors far in excess of any which could be implied from state statutes,
charters or by-laws. 60
The willingness of the Commission to make such bargains is also evident
where the declarant has attempted to refund bonds. Here, too, the Com-
mission, in certain instances, has moved far in advance of the traditional
scope of the rule against impairment. In two cases where the debt-asset ratio
55. See cases cited supra note 54, especially Central Ohio Light & Power Co. case,
56. See note 55 supra.
57. Holding Company Act Release No. 1427, Jan. 30, 1939.
58. North American Co., supra note 57, at 30. (Commissioner Frank dissenting).
59. Or an existing Reserve for Revaluation, which Reserve, however, was not to be
augmented except by transfers from Earned Surplus.
60. The Commission also reserved jurisdiction over charges to the Reserve for Con-
tingencies to exclude charges more properly made to Earned Surplus, In addition, pre-
ferred stockholders were given voting rights in default, based again on the Commission's
"informal suggestions."
[Vol. 49: 492
1940] CONTROL OVER CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 509
was a high one, the Commission reserved jurisdiction over common and
preferred dividends in one instance,6 ' and over common in another,0 - pre-
sumably even though earned surplus was available. In the latter of the two
cases the Commission said:
"The extremely unsatisfactory ratio of debt to property indicates
that the need for increasing the common stock equity of the appli-
cant is very real. The order granting exemption will therefore
contain the condition that no dividend upon the common stock of
applicant shall be declared or paid except with the approval of this
Commission." '3
In the same case, by way of dictum, the Commission said that it would
decline, if the application were made, to permit the applicant to sell other
bonds then in the treasury.
The standards thus set, in the bond refunding cases,"' for the restrictions
on dividends are on a much higher level than those which freeze only the
original capital investment, even though that capital investment be entirely
inadequate. Effective administration of the "debt-asset ratio" criterion, how-
ever, calls for a realistic valuation of the assets, rather than an historical
valuation based on some accounting measure such as cost of acquisition or
cost when first dedicated to the public use. The Commission was confronted
with just such a problem in the important Public Scrvice of Colorado case.c5
There the elimination of the intercompany profit from the asset accounts
revealed that each $1 of original cost of assets supported $1.01 of debt.c
Such a situation, however, did not automatically warrant an absolute pro-
hibition of dividends or an absolute refusal to permit the issue of the bonds.
In this instance, the corporation had demonstrated its ability not only to
meet its bond interest and preferred stock dividend requirements regularly
but had continued to pay substantial annual common dividends out of earn-
ings. Recognizing that the actual value of the assets was more nearly a
capitalization of the company's earning power than a function of historical
61. Republic Service Corp., 2 S. E. C. 44 (1937). The Commission did not reveal
how high the ratio was.
62. Virginia Public Service Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1296, Oct. 23,
1938. The debt-asset ratio, after eliminating write-ups, was 86.8%.
63. Id. at 10.
64. In a few instances, the Commission has restricted dividends to future earnings.
Sioux City Gas & Electric Co., 1 S. E. C. 570 (1936) (debt-asset ratio 80%, fixed charges
covered 1.70 times and fixed charges and preferred stock dividends 1.04 times); Iowa
Public Service Co., 2 S. E. C. 447 (1937) ; Central Illinois Electric and Gas Co., Hold-
ing Company Act Release No. 1592, June 19, 1939 (debt-asset ratio 107.85; fixed charg-
es covered 2.10 times). Provision has also been made in these cases for adequate depre-
ciation and maintenance charges.
65. Holding Company Act Release No. 1701, Aug. 24, 1939.
66. During the course of intercompany transactions, the parent acquired all the cap-
ital stock at no cost. Indeed, the parent profited in the process by some $1,300,000.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
accounting cost,6 7 the Commission imposed dividend restrictions substantially
less than would have been imposed by the rule against impairment. Although
the elimination of the "water" in the assets revealed a book impairment of
over $20,000,000, the company was permitted to pay dividends conditioned
only upon a slow freezing of $7,800,000 into the capital cushion.08 This
amount was to be provided by immediate conversion into common stock
of a current account of $2,200,000 owed the parent, the freezing of an existing
book surplus of $600,000 and the reservation from earnings of $500,000 each
year for ten years. Had the rule against impairment been applied, the
dividends of this company might have been entirely restricted until the dif-
ference between real and book value of the assets had been eliminated, while
the dividends in the aforementioned two cases might have gone scot-free',
- results unjustified from the standpoint of realistic valuation. 70
The cases under Section 6(a) (2), involving reductions of capital stock,
likewise illuminate the flexible levels of restriction which the Commission
has imposed. In the Green Mountain case, the Commission resorted to the
most restrictive of any of the conditions imposed in the reduction cases. 71
There, when the declarant sought to reduce its capital stock to permit a
write-down of fixed assets, thus paving the way for a refunding program,
67. The Commission has said that "for purposes of reorganization as distinguished
from 'value for rate-making purposes' earning power becomes in the final analysis a
paramount criterion [of the worth of a company's assets]," Genessee Valley Gas Co.,
Inc., 3 S. E. C. 104, 112 (1938); and that "for reorganization purposes earning power
rather than the book value of assets is the best test of value," Community Power & Light
Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1803, Nov. 18, 1939, p. 10. The object of valua-
tion for reorganization purposes is much the same as it is for investor protection from
distributions-to determine the amount of assets available to the various classes of in-
vestors. In public utility cases, however, because of the complications of rate-making,
"the earning power must be read with special connotations derived from the fact that
rates . . . will be subject to control by public authorities." Commissioner Eicher, con-
curring in the Public Service of Colorado case, at 45. C1. Central Illinois Electric & Gas
Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1592, June 19, 1939, Commissioners Healy,
Eicher and Frank concurring at 13, 18, and 19 respectively.
68. Assuming that the Commission does not subsequently take a different stand under
§ 12 (c).
69. See note 31 supra.
70. Commissioner Healy, dissenting at 47, felt the SEC was bound by the historical
cost figures which indicated a debt-asset ratio of over 100%. "Section 7 (d) (1) does not
necessarily embody a prudent investment or original cost standard, but I do believe that
it includes the standard of 'actual investment.' Actual investment excludes self-serving
declarations of value and arbitrary appraisals. Actual investment is a matter of his-
tory, not of speculation"--p. 62.
71. Green Mountain Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 1345, Dec. 6,
1938. In New York & Richmond Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1442,
Feb. 16, 1939, the Commissioner prohibited the payment of any dividends without appli-
cation under § 12 (c) (2). There, however, the reduction had not cleared away the uncer-
tainties surrounding the property account. It is not believed this case goes as far as the
Green Mountain case.
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the declaration was approved subject to the provision that no distribution
be made until accumulated earned surplus or new common capital exceed
the amount of the reduction32 The real need for protection in the Green
Mountain case was emphasized by the comparative financial weakness of the
company, as indicated by existing arrearages on the preferred stock, a slender
margin of earnings available over the dividend requirements of the preferred
shares, and a meager surplus account. In cases where the earnings available
for the preferred were much more substantial, the Commission has imposed
no such limitations upon dividends, but has contented itself with supervision
of the charges made against the reduction surplus account to insure against
diversion to that account of amounts more properly to be charged to earned
surplus.73  In between these two poles is the important Columbia Gas case
involving a reduction of capital stock.74 The significance of this ease, however,
can be understood only after considering the Commission's ruling upon prior
applications by the company for permission to pay preferred and common
stock dividends out of capital surplus.
In passing upon the company's dividend applications, the Commission had
been greatly influenced by the consideration that the elimination of sub-
stantial intercompany write-ups of assets would greatly impair-to the
extent, as subsequently developed, of at least $60,000,000- the stated capital.
Since there existed, in addition to this impairment, pending extraordinary
litigation, substantial liquidating values of the preferred stock in excess of
the par values,75 a consistent draining of surplus and an unsettled general
72. Although, from the viewpoint of the preferred stockholder the cushion behind
him was in accord with the rule of Wood v. Dzunncr, insofar as the replenishment of the
amount of reduction by the infusion of new common capital allowed the declarant to pay
dividends on new and old common stock before restoration of old capital, the protection
afforded the old common stockholders was not equal to the standard of the rule against
impairment.
73. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1243, Sept.
15. 1938; United Fuel Gas Co.. Holding Company Act Release No. 13G0, Dec. 9, 193S;
Ohio Fuel Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1720, Aug. 30, 1939. In the
Cincinnati Gas case, the applicant earned its preferred dividends more than twice, despite
a liberal maintenance and reserve policy, whereas in the Grcen Mountain case, the pre-
ferred dividend coverage over a period of eight years averaged about 125. In a few in-
stances the Commission has approved the reduction without condition, although the basis
of the decision is not clear from the opinions. San Antonio Public Service Co., 2 S. E. C.
366 (1937); American Public Service Co., 2 S. E. C. 47 (1937).
74. Holding Company Act Release No. 1417, Jan. 25, 1939. This case should be dis-
tinguished from the series of applications made by the same company for permission to
pay dividends out of capital surplus, and reported under Release Nos. 1055 [3 S. E. C.
313 (1938)] 1152, 1265, and 1413.
75. The Commission has taken the justifiable position that it should consider the
liquidating preferences of the preferred stock as well as the par value in determining the
availability of surplus for dividends. Cf. SEC Accounting Release No. 9, Dec. 23, 1933,
135 C. C. H. Stock Exch. Reg. Serv., g 8601.
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business situation, the Commission's prohibition of common stock dividends
may have been warranted. The Commission, however, in view of a pre-
viously uninterrupted preferred dividend record, did not prohibit preferred
dividends, but conditioned their payment upon a restoration of surplus out
of the first subsequent earnings.
Confronted with the prohibition of common dividends resulting from im-
pairment of capital stock, Columbia applied to the Commission for leave
to reduce the stated value of its capital stock to create a reduction surplus
against which to charge the overvaluation in the assets. The Commission,
because it has taken the unnecessary view that if it consents to a reduction,
dividends out of subsequent earnings are freed from its jurisdiction, 0 was
forced to give careful consideration to the conditions which it ought to impose
to protect preferred stockholders and creditors. It seems obvious that the
reduction in the stated capital should not reduce the protection accorded
for, regardless of accounting manipulations, there is still an intrinsic impair-
ment of capital. Yet the Commission partially removed the bars with which
it had previously surrounded common dividends, by allowing their payment
if sufficient surplus accumulated out of earnings subsequent to the reduction
remained thereafter to equal preferred dividend requirements for a year
and a half. The SEC then directed that the reduction be put to a class vote
of the preferred stock. Thus, in the face of a potential impairment of capital
of at least $60,000,000 the Commission permitted preferred and common
dividends out of future earnings, contingent only upon the condition that
common dividends be subject to an accumulation, for the protection of the
preferred shareholders, of a year and a half's preferred dividends, about
$10,000,000; and the meaningless formality of a favorable vote of preferred
shareholders.
The conclusion which the Commission reached in the series of Columbia
Gas cases was reached in the face of the Congressional prohibition, in Sec-
tion 12(c), of dividends out of capital or unearned surplus, which the
Commission has interpreted to create "a strong presumption against the
propriety of payment of dividends when capital is impaired."' 77 In the other
three important dividend cases before it-the United Corporation,7 8 Securities
General79 and International Utilities cases 80 - the Commission also overcame
the presumption, and sanctioned dividends on preferred stock despite, in the
United Corporation case, impairment of capital surplus, and in the other
76. See note 43 supra.
77. Columbia Gas & Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1417, Jan.
25, 1939, p. 8.
78. The United Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 1830, Dec. 9,1939.
79. Securities Corporation General, Holding Company Act Release Nos. 1704, Aug.
24, 1939, and 1775, Nov. 2, 1939.
80. International Utilities Corp., Holding Company Act Release Nos. 1643, July
18, 1939, and 1753, Oct. 13, 1939.
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two cases, substantial impairments of the junior equity.8' In the last two
cases, the Commission was influenced by the liquidity s of the companies
and the presence of an adequate protective cushion sa behind the preferred
stock.
These cases suggest that there are circumstances in which it would be
permissible to pay dividends out of other than earned surplus. One of these
instances is presented by the Columbia Gas situation. There the alleged
"impairment" was created at the organization of the company by accounting
manipulations which placed the assets on the books at values higher than
warranted by conservative accounting practice. Since, however, the actual
assets had not been dissipated8 4 and the earnings available for dividends
substantially exceeded preferred requirements, the Commission was justified
in permitting the company to correct its balance sheet without paying a
penalty for faulty bookkeeping. A second legitimate occasion for distribu-
tion out of other than earned surplus would seem to be presented where
a corporation finds itself with a substantial amount of extra assets not needed
in the business, as for example in the instance of a "wasting-asset" concern.P
If a careful survey of the remaining assets indicates a substantial protection
to senior investors, the Commission should not stand in the way of such
distribution. The Uvited Corporation case may be placed in this category.
81. Pending before the Commission are two important cases under Section 12 (c).
One of them may provide a test of the validity of Rule U-12C-3, supra note 49. Asso-
dated Gas and Electric Corporation, Holding Company Act Releases 1795, 1800, 1801,
1811. The other case is Metropolitan Edison Co., Holding Company Act Release 1817,
Dec. 1, 1939. The Associated Gas case and the Metropolitan Edison case represent the
first instances where the Commission has itself instituted the proceedings.
82. The Commission has consistently considered the liquidity of a corporation's assets
in its cases under § 12 (c). International Utilities Corp., Holding Company Act Release
No. 1643, July 18, 1939, p. 7, and Release No. 1753, Oct. 18, 1939, p. 7; Columbia Gas &
Electric Corp., 3 S. E. C. 313, 321 (1938). Illinois Power & Light Corp., 2 S. E. C.
263 (1937) (a condition was imposed that the payments do not reduce the ratio of cur-
rent assets below 1% times current liabilities. The stock acquisition cases under Rule
U-12C-1, comparatively unimportant, also consider the companies' current ratios. Mid-
dle West Utilities Co. of Canada, Ltd., 2 S. E. C. 475 (1937); Engineers Public Service
Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1453, Feb. 27, 1939; Middle "West Utilities Co.
of Canada, Ltd., Holding Company Act Release No. 1748, Oct. 2, 1939.
83. The cushion in the Securities General case amounted to 79c of the liquidating
value of the preferred stock; in the International Utilities case to 145% and 210% on the
first and second preferred issues, respectively. In the North American case, the commis-
sion provided for a cushion of 150% behind the preferred stock.
84. In Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 3 S. E. C. 313 (1933) the Commission raid
dividends had been paid in excess of earnings during the years 1936 and 1937. However,
the Company had earned since organization some $202,000,000 and had paid out in cash
only $175,000,000. Stock dividends, not constituting a distribution of assets, amounted to
$61,000,000.
85. The state statutes generally permit the return of capital currently out of deple-
tion. DEL. REv. CoDE (1935) § 2066. For the economic justification see note 27 supra.
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The Securities General and International Utilities cases, however, fall in a
third category; for in each of the two companies, the impairment was a
result of a dissipation of assets - mostly marketable securities - by a decline
in their real values. In such cases it becomes crucial to decide whether the
value of the assets has so far declined that the advantages which might be
realized by a recapitalization in the nature of a reorganization should be
sought.8 6 Upon that recapitalization the full loss, under existing reorganiza-
tion standards, 8 7 should be visited upon the junior stockholders, and criteria
for protection should be readjusted to reflect the changed equities of the
various classes of securities. Thus, if the Commission decides, as it did in
the International Utilities case, that the recapitalization is advisable, it may
ignore the equities of the junior investors which would disappear upon the
consummation of the reorganization. It may be assumed that this situation
obtained, sub silentio, in the Securities General case. If, however, the need
for reorganization is not clearly indicated, dividends on the preferred stock
should not be permitted while a common stock impairment remains. In no
sense can it be maintained that the common stockholders have assumed the
risk of embarrassing payments of preferred dividends. Preferred stockholders
have a legal right to the accrual of dividends but not to their immediate
payment.""
CoNCLUSION
The cases under Section 12(c) and those under Section 6(a) indicate
that the Commission has made substantial progress in developing a program
to protect investors in securities of public utility holding companies and their
subsidiaries from losses due to undue withdrawals of assets or improperly
balanced financial structures. The level of regulation has passed far beyond
that developed in the states. Every case before the Commission represents
a situation where the state laws offer no impediment to the issue of securities
86. A reorganization would serve no purpose in cutting down common capitalization
unless in addition it provided for a balanced financial structure by (a) cutting down fixed
charges, (b) cutting down accrued charges, or (c) paving the way for needed new cap-
ital. Unless a reduction of common stock, therefore, makes possible greater facility in
new financing, there is no justification for a reorganization even though the common
may not be worth much. Under such circumstances the Commission might well redis-
tribute the voting power to reflect the changed present equities, see note 48 supra, but
should not proceed to the extent of permitting preferred dividends in the face of a common
impairment. Furthermore, if new money is needed it seems probable that the manage-
ment should not be declaring dividends out of reduced capital. Each situation calls for
careful analysis by the Commission.
87. See note 38 supra.
88. It is well settled that a debtor-creditor relationship is not created until the divi-
dend has been declared. Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 921
(D. Md. 1938). Directors have broad discretion as to the declaration of dividends.
BERLE AND MEANS, 189-90; SEC REPORT, Pt. VII (1938) 112, n. 9.
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or the withdrawal of assets. Furthernore, a system operating through the
prevention of distributions by "licensing" provisions is calculated to be
infinitely more effective than one which can be enforced only by remedial
action after the distributions have been made.
A careful scrutiny of the cases, moreover, reveals that the Commission
is appraising each situation from a highly practical viewpoint. Consideration
of the existence of liquidation preferences on the preferred shares, of unsettled
business conditions, pending litigation and adequacy of earning power, of
liquidity of assets, ratio of debt to assets, and soundness of accounting methods,
makes each case an inquiry into the needs and structure of the particular
business. The proceeding is designed, in terms of the particular facts of
the case, to protect the investor adequately, while granting the corporation
the flexibility required for legitimate corporate purposes.
It is this emphasis on individual analysis which explains the deviation
of the decisions from the absolute standard of the rule against impairment.
Thus in the cases involving refunding of preferred stock and bonds the
Commission's position has generally been in excess of the requirements of
the rule of Wood v. Dummer- witness the 15% added cushion in the North
American case. Conspicuous by its lower standards, on the other hand, is
the Public Service of Colorado case, a decision obviously justified by the
financial strength of the corporation. The "reduction of capital stock" cases,
too, have been characterized by a relaxation of the rule against impairment,
most conspicuously in the Columbia Gas case. Yet among these cases stands
the Green 11ountain case, virtually re-enacting the requirements of Wood
v. Dumnmer.
The Columbia Gas, Public Service of Colorado and North Amcrican cases
have provoked the criticism that the Commission has been too lenient in the
conditions it has imposed. 9 That is a matter of opinion, to be tested by the
future experience of investors in these companies. But the position some-
times taken by the Commission 0 that it should tread lightly in these refund-
ing situations, hardly seems justifiable. These cases, just as much as do
cases involving new issues of securities, present an opportunity and a need
to effectuate the purpose of the Act - protection of investors.2 1
More susceptible to criticism than alleged practices of leniency are two
policies of the Commission which may tend to recur. One is the predilection
89. Criticising Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., Holding Company Act Release No.
1417, Jan. 25, 1939, were Commissioner Mathews, concurring at 17, and Commissioner
Frank, dissenting in the North Ancrican case. But see Note (1938) 33 Ia. L. R-v.
220. On the North Amncrica, case, in addition to the dissent of Commissioner Frank, Eee
Comment (1938) 52 HARv. L. REv. 1331.
90. Cf. Public Service Co. of Colorado, Holding Company Act Release Xo. 1701,
Aug. 24, 1939, p. 34.
91. The purchasers of securities issued for refunding purposes may well be nev,
investors.
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of the Commission to side-step an absolute valuation of the assets and an
absolute decision on the propriety of the corporate program. Thus, in the
Columbia Gas case, the ultimate approval of the reduction was left to the vote
of the stockholders. The Commission is well aware of the ineffectual power
of the proxy machine to effectuate the desires and interests of the stock-
holders. 92
Worthy of serious re-examination, also, is the Commission's attitude that
although there is a strong presumption against the payment of dividends out
of capital or unearned surplus, there are less serious obstacles to permitting
the payment of dividends to preferred stockholders while common capital
is impaired than to permitting payments to common stockholders. In its
cases under Section 12(c), the Commission may have been justified in per-
mitting preferred dividends out of capital surplus, when the financial position
of the declarant was sound and the impairment was a result of accounting
manipulations, or when the need for reorganization was clear. But in its
decis:ons under Section 6(a) the Commission has also consistently imposed
restrictions upon common stock dividends but none upon preferred without
expressly considering these factors.93 Unless the Commission clearly analyzes
the rights of the common stockholder in each case, the latter may suffer
irreparable injury, when dividends to preferred shareholders so weaken the
financial structure that the full impact of the bankruptcy law is visited on
the junior equities.0 4
These are isolated matters of criticism; it is apparent that the Commission's
administration of the distribution problem has been, on the whole, a distinct
advance. The success of this experiment may encourage a wider application
to large industrial corporations of the principles of protection enumerated
under the Holding Company Act. It seems clear that the power to protect
investors from improper withdrawals of assets is beyond the ability of the
states. Even were the states to see the error of their ways, correction of the
existing abuses would be a drawn-out process. So long as one corporate
"Reno" remained, the prophylactic efforts of the other forty-seven states
would be vitiated.
The control of corporate distributions seems, then, peculiarly fitted to
federal control.95 The logical method of control would appear to be an admin-
92. The Commission presently proposes to put into effect even more stringent proxy
rules. N. Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1939, § 3, p. 1, col. 1.
93. This tendency of the Commission is illustrated in Virginia Public Service Co.,
cited supra note 62; North American Company, cited supra note 57; Green Mountain
Power Corp., cited supra note 71; and cases cited supra note 54.
94. This is especially true where the management may be identified with the pre-
ferred stock or the common stock is not in the hands of a parent holding company cap-
able of looking out for its own interests.
95. Development of a policy of federal control might require removal of some of the
forces at work in the government's tax structure, tending to unbalanced corporate finan-
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istrative program under the aegis of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. There are indications, however, that the task of administering a
more widely applicable "Section 12(c)" would be insuperable when coupled
with the tremendous program now before the Commission.00  Worthy of a
trial, for this reason, is the alternate suggestion"7 that there be formed, under
federal supervision, a Stockholders' and Bondholders' Protective Committee
whose bargaining strength might be equal to the task of dealing with the
financial wizards of the large corporations."
cial structures. The undistributed profits tax, now repealed, was of such a nature. Cf.
IxT. REv. CODE § 102 (1939) ; T. D. 4914, discussed in 1 Prentice-Hall Federal Tax Ser-
vice (1940) 4703-A; Rudick, § o2 and Personal Holding Company Protisions of the
Internal Revenue Code (1939) 49 YLE L. J. 171, 195. By treating bond interest, but not
dividends, as taxable deductions, the tax statutes encourage debt financing. Another ad-
verse factor encouraging debt financing are the "legal lists" of insurance companies, Eav-
ings banks and trustees. Cf. TwENTirE CENTtIRY FUND, DEmrs A. r_.cov'rv, 1929 ro
1937 (1938) 255-261.
96. Still ahead of the SEC besides its now somewhat routine duties of policing the
stock exchanges and scanning registration statements of security issuers are the man-
sized job of executing the "death sentence clause" of the Holding Company Act and the
exercise of the Commission's duties under the Trust Indenture Act and under the Chapter
X reorganization cases of the Chandler Act.
97. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct (1934) 47 HARv. L. P-v. 1305, 1330-
34; SEC REPoRT, Pt. VII (1938) 413.
98. The words of Commissioner Frank, dissenting in the North American case, at
29, should be noted:
"I shall make bold, in this opinion, to express my views with some vigor
and in detail because it is becoming increasingly evident that protection of
investors is essential to the preservation of American democracy. Ours is a
profit system, a system cherished by the great majority of Americans. If that
system cannot be made to work well, then that majority, including as a major
factor the numerous middle class who are investors, may, as in other lands.
turn to extremists, of the 'right' or 'left' who will fatuously promise (and
with no chance of fulfilment) a better life under some form of dictatorship."
